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 The increased use of campaign advertising in judicial elections since Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), has attracted a considerable amount 
criticism. Opponents of campaign advertising in judicial elections point to anecdotal 
examples of negative advertising that are inaccurate and have misled voters with their 
presentations of the facts. Meanwhile, scholars studying judicial elections have 
performed aggregate-level analyses of the campaign advertising environment and judicial 
elections outcomes and have concluded that the arguments of the critics are unfounded. 
However, the critics remain unconvinced and debate continues. This study adds to the 
debate on campaign advertising in judicial elections by exposing 652 college 
undergraduates to two versions of the same ad, manipulated to alter the tone between 
positive and negative. A post-viewing questionnaire was administered to evaluate the 
effects of the campaign advertisement’s tone on measures of individual voter behavior. 
The results of this study suggests that negative campaign advertising is not without its 
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For the 2016 legislative session Oklahoma State Representative Kevin Calvey 
authored House Joint Resolution 1037, currently under consideration, which, if passed, 
would put to the voters of Oklahoma for their approval a constitutional amendment that 
would eliminate the current merit-based selection scheme represented by the Oklahoma 
Judicial Nominating Commission and instead allow for the election of judges to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court and other appellate courts.1 While elections for state supreme 
courts are far from uncommon, with 38 states employing them in some form, there is 
considerable hesitation within the Oklahoma legal community about Calvey’s measure. 
Proponents of electing judges see it as a way to enhance the judicial branch’s 
accountability to voters. Opponents of the measure see it as a means for exacerbating the 
polarized political conflicts that do appear within the staid environment of our courts. For 
instance, last year Calvey also threatened to immolate himself during a debate over the 
                                                          





recent decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court regarding abortion, which were 
inconsistent with Calvey’s own beliefs and those of his constituents.2 
Still others strike a cautionary tone and invoke Oklahoma’s particularly troubled 
history of corruption in judicial elections. In the 1950s, a scandal broke that implicated 
three justices on the court in taking bribes in return for favorable decisions.3 It was in 
response to this scandal that Oklahoma instituted its current merit-based system and, for 
the time being, bid farewell to electing members to its highest court in an effort to curb 
impropriety and restore legitimacy to a tarnished and beleaguered institution. The 
possibility of elections for members of the Oklahoma Supreme Court has ignited anew a 
debate over accountability versus legitimacy in the selection of judges.  
Historical scandals notwithstanding, the story of judicial selection in Oklahoma 
mirrors the larger debate among judicial scholars over elections for judicial office that 
has emerged since the 2002 decision Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (536 U.S. 
765, 2002) struck down state judicial ethic codes that forbade judicial candidates from 
discussing political issues in their campaigns. Almost immediately, concerns were raised 
about the impact such a decision would have on the integrity of state court systems 
around the United States. Iyengar (2001/2002), extrapolating from his studies on 
campaign advertising in legislative and executive races, predicted that the prevalence of 
negative advertising in judicial elections would increase due to its effectiveness as a 
campaign tactic and as a result would have a negative impact on public perceptions about 
                                                          
2 “Oklahoma lawmaker threatens to set himself on fire over abortion issue.” 
http://newsok.com/article/5414125. Accessed March 13th, 2016. 
3 “HJR 1037: Return of Oklahoma’s ‘Rotten political system’.” http://nondoc.com/2016/02/26/hjr-1037-
return-of-oklahomas-rotten-political-system/. Accessed March 13th, 2016. 
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the legitimacy of the judicial branch similar to those found in the legislative and 
executive branches.  
Additionally, the availability of campaign advertising as a strategy for judicial 
candidates would increase the costs associated with campaigning for judicial office, thus 
causing an increase in fundraising efforts. Since 2000 the Justice at Stake Campaign, a 
partnership between the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of 
Law and the National Institute on Money in State Politics, has published biennial reports 
documenting the conduct of state supreme court races in an effort to highlight the 
problematic relationship between campaign speech, televised candidate advertising, and 
the potential for conflicts of interest that may result from fundraising for judicial 
elections (Goldberg, Holman, and Sanchez 2002; Goldberg and Sanchez 2004; Goldberg, 
Samis, Bender, and Weiss 2005; Sample, Jones, and Weiss 2007; Sample, Skaggs, 
Blitzer, and Casey 2010; Bannon, Velasco, Casey, and Reagan 2013; Greytak, Bannon, 
Falce, and Casey 2015).  
Some aspects of these doomsday predictions were observed by judicial politics 
scholars, but it is not yet apparent that the White decision has had the kind of impact on 
judicial elections that the Iyengar (2001/2002) and the Justice at Stake Campaign 
believed it would. Systematic comparisons of new style judicial elections has resulted in 
several findings that run counter to the delegitimizing narrative from above. Gibson 
(2008a, 2009) found that a candidate making policy pronouncements or promising to 
decide cases in a certain way according to broader policy positions did not decrease, but 
rather increased the voters’ belief that the candidate could be a fair policy maker. Races 
with large amounts of campaign spending and those featuring negative attack advertising 
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(Hall and Bonneau 2008, Hall and Bonneau 2013) mobilize rather than demobilize the 
electorate. Just like in legislative and executive races, the more expensive, competitive, 
and perhaps nastier the campaign (Hall 2007), the more the electorate pays attention and 
is likely to engage in the democratic process by voting. Indeed, multiple studies 
(Bonneau, Hall, and Streb 2011, Bonneau and Hall 2013) have failed to find an empirical 
difference between judicial elections before the White decision and those occurring after. 
This debate over the merits of using elections as a selection mechanism for 
judges, however, continues. A key element in this debate is related to the role that 
televised advertisements play in campaigns for judicial office. The overwhelming focus 
on criminal justice issues found in positive and negative ads in recent years, regardless of 
sponsor, is problematic due to the tendency to disregard the nuances of legal decision 
making and for its effects on the fate of criminal defendants. Incumbent judges with 
upcoming elections are likely to face pressure to side against criminal defendants for fear 
that the decision will come back to haunt them in the form of a distorted attack ad 
(Salamone, Yoesle, and Ridout 2014; Greytak, et. al. 2015). Taken with Hall’s finding 
that attack advertising decreased the vote share of incumbent judges in nonpartisan 
elections for state supreme court seats, negative attack advertising is unlikely to diminish 
in volume for the foreseeable future (Hall 2015). Consequently, one can imagine that the 
issues identified by academic scholars about the conduct of judicial elections will 
continue to develop as well.  
This study seeks to understand how the presence of negative advertising affects 
elections for judicial office. It considers the individual voter level effects of negative and 
positive advertisements used to inform voters of a judicial candidate’s qualifications. 
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While much research has been done analyzing the aggregate-level features of judicial 
elections, such as type of election, presence and performance of challengers, fundraising, 
voter mobilization, and even campaign advertising (Hall 2001; Bonneau and Hall 2003; 
Hall and Bonneau 2006; Bonneau 2007; Hall and Bonneau 2008; Bonneau and Cann 
2011; Bonneau, et. al. 2011; Hall and Bonneau 2013; Hall 2015), comparatively little 
research is available at the individual-level that focuses on the potential of campaign 
advertising in judicial elections to inform voters. What individual-level research there is 
on judicial elections (Gibson 2008a; 2009) tends to focus on the effects of negative 
advertising on individual perceptions of the judiciary as a whole, rather than the learning 
of information from positive or negative ads.  
The potential for negative advertisements to inform voters is important because it 
must be balanced against any potentially harmful effects that negative advertising might 
have. Negative campaign advertising has been characterized as harmful by some scholars 
because it creates biased or inaccurate perceptions of political actors and events and can 
leave voters with an unwholesome impression of politics in general, yet others contend 
that negative advertising increases voter learning with a strident tone that grabs viewers’ 
attention and makes them more likely to retain the information contained within those ads 
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Geer 2006; Brader 2006). While these two 
characterizations of negative advertising are not necessarily mutually exclusive, those in 
favor of reforming or eliminating judicial elections to limit the presence of negative 
campaign advertising tend to emphasize the first characterization of negative advertising, 
while those urging caution point simply to the non-effects of negative advertising at the 
aggregate level. To that end, this study employs an experimental design that centers upon 
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a fictional campaign advertisement. The project gauges the difference in respondents’ 
recall of information about a candidate for judicial office. It also considers the difference 
in voter evaluations and likelihood of voting for a candidate at the individual level.  
The results of this study are positioned to expand the understanding of the role of 
campaign advertising in judicial elections in a few ways. By utilizing an experimental 
design that manipulates the positive and negative tone of an advertisement, this study 
generates findings that speak directly to the effects of the content in a judicial campaign 
advertisement rather than the effects of the campaign advertising environment in a 
judicial election as a whole. By focusing on the effects of positively and negatively toned 
advertisements on individual voting behavior, this study has the potential to reinforce or 
modify aggregate-level findings about voter behavior and campaign advertising in 
judicial elections. Finally, the findings of this study can inform thinking about campaign 
strategy in judicial elections for candidates and academics alike.  
The study is organized as follows. First I review the relevant literature on judicial 
elections, campaign advertising, and voter learning in elections. Next I describe the 
experimental methodology used to investigate the individual-level effects of judicial 
campaign advertising. I then move on to an analysis and discussion of the results of the 
experiment. Finally, I conclude with a comment on what these results may mean for 






REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
To study the individual level effects of campaign advertising in judicial elections, 
three bodies of literature were consulted. I first consider how voters learn about political 
information, as campaign ads are packages for the transmission of political information 
and are crafted in such a way as to have the greatest effect possible. Next, I look at the 
previous scholarship on the effects of campaign advertising in legislative and executive 
races to highlight the differences between the role of campaign advertising in non-judicial 
and judicial contexts and to draw methodological insight for the present study. Finally, I 
examine the literature on judicial selection systems to highlight the current knowledge of 
campaign advertising effects in that arena.  
 
Political Information, Voter Learning, and Candidate Evaluations 
Conventional wisdom in political science holds that most people know little about 
politics. Converse (1964) demonstrated that the American public lacks political 
information and that most Americans are not politically sophisticated. Even the 




More recent research has shown that possession of political information is unequally 
distributed in the population, and this unequal distribution of information could matter 
insofar as greater stores of political information correspond with greater levels of political 
involvement, thus producing unequal participation in the political process (Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996). Heuristics such as class and partisanship can overcome deficits in 
concrete facts to help individuals make sense of the political world (Hamill, Lodge, and 
Blake 1985). However, individuals still require some amount of political information to 
make even heuristic judgments about political matters (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). If 
most people are lacking in political information, though, how might they acquire more of 
it?  
Zaller’s (1991; 1992) work on mass opinion provides valuable insights into this 
question. Zaller’s (1992) Receive Accept Sample (RAS) of public opinion formation is 
based on a few intuitive principles about the characteristics of the information transmitted 
and the individual receiving it. The formation of public opinion involves an interaction 
between the elite discourse about political affairs that is carried in the media 
environment, which Zaller (1991) refers to as a “flow” of information (1215), and the 
political predispositions and cognitive engagement of individuals exposed to those 
information flows. Information has an ideological tint, as well as a valence of support or 
detraction for a position, and these are the messages that are sent to individual for 
reception. Reception is conditional on political awareness, as one must understand a 
message is political in order to receive the information contained therein. Acceptance of 
the message is then conditional on the predispositions of individuals, such as their 
political identification or values. Political awareness also matters, because individuals 
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have to understand the political cues contained in the message in order to appropriately 
evaluate it for acceptance or dismissal. Finally, if a message is both received and 
accepted, it is stored for sampling at a later time when opinions about political objects are 
solicited. In Zaller’s (1991; 1992) model, public opinion then becomes the aggregate 
sampling of available accepted information by individuals in responses to survey 
questions.  
Zaller (1991; 1992) makes a case for a memory-driven process of information and 
opinion formation, but the on-line model of this process offers an alternative view 
(Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; 1990; Lodge, Stroh, and Wahlke 1990; Lodge, 
Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). The on-line model holds that individuals receive pieces of 
political information and then, based on the tone of the message sent, update an affective 
on-line tally of how they feel about the subject of the political information and message 
used to transmit that information. It is this affective tally and not the specific piece of 
information contained in the message that is utilized by individuals to make decisions 
about political issues, as once the on-line tally is updated the specific piece of 
information is incorporated into the evaluation. The proponents point to this process as an 
explanation of the apparent paradox between observed levels of low political information 
in individuals and rational candidate evaluations in the aggregate (Lodge, et. al. 1995). 
This study does not seek to validate the theoretical reasoning of one or the other of these 
two models of information processing. Instead, it seeks to integrate them and leverage 
their collective insights about individual-level processes of information exposure, 
information recall, and candidate evaluations within the context of judicial elections. 
Indeed, Zaller’s (1991; 1992) model is more directly focused on mass opinion formation 
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about political issues, while the on-line model is concerned with processes of candidate 
evaluation. While Zaller (1991; 1992) is concerned with the effects of mass media on this 
process, it could also be applied to informational messages contained in campaign 
advertising. At a minimum, both models identify three components that are involved in 
the processing of political information: 1) the characteristics of the message; 2) the 
characteristics of the individual, and 3) the interaction of those two components to create 
evaluations of political objects. To apply these insights to campaign advertising in 
judicial elections and its effects on individual-level processes of voter behavior, it is 
instructive to turn to the literature on campaign advertising in non-judicial races to see 
how political information is packaged in campaign advertisements.  
 
Campaign Advertising in the Other Branches 
Given the dearth of studies on campaign advertising in judicial elections that are 
focused on the individual level, the study of campaign advertising in legislative and 
executive races provides a wealth of theoretical insight into the role campaign advertising 
might play at the individual level in judicial elections. A landmark study by Patterson and 
McClure (1976) framed the initial debate about campaign advertising in terms of its 
informational effects on individuals. Using data from personal interviews, campaign 
advertisements, and television news coverage of the 1972 presidential campaign, the 
authors found that individuals exposed to higher levels of campaign advertising were 
more knowledgeable on the issues at the end of the campaign than voters that reported a 
low level of exposure to campaign advertising. A content analysis of television news 
coverage showed that more time was spent covering events taking place during the 
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campaign and less on the issues featured in the campaign. The ultimate conclusion drawn 
from the Patterson and McClure (1976) study was that campaign advertising was a useful 
tool for informing voters and controlling the message of a candidate.  
This finding is somewhat time-bound, however, and limited to the campaign 
advertising environment of the 1972 presidential election. Kern (1989) makes this point 
and describes the change in the advertising environment that had occurred since Patterson 
and McClure’s study (1976). More information about issues was contained in the 1980s 
ads than in the television news coverage, but Kern (1989) notes that changes in schools of 
thought about advertising among practitioners meant that information was packaged in 
“slogan” style ads that featured little in the way of specific policy positions and instead 
focused on dovetailing candidate characteristics with vague references to issues (51). 
Moreover, the use of the long-form, multi-minute advertisements that was prevalent in 
the 1972 campaign had declined over the intervening years, replaced by a higher volume 
of shorter :30 second and 1 minute advertisements. Kern (1989) also provided a typology 
of negative advertising which is more focused on the emotional appeals utilized by 
negative ads but does not speak to the informative effects of these different types of 
appeals. Kern’s (1989) research suggests that advertisements that are shorter in length 
and more negative in tone can offer little substantive information to voters.  
The changing ad environment of the late 1980s and early 1990s brought with it a 
new focus on negative advertising and its constituent effects and has inspired an enduring 
debate. The Ansolabehere and Iyengar studies (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and 
Valentino 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995) utilized an experimental design to 
measure the differences in voters’ intention to vote and candidate evaluations between 
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groups exposed to negative or positive advertising. While categorizations of ad types 
varies, the generally accepted coding of ads is tripartite: negative ads mention and 
criticize an opponent, positive ads only mention a candidate, and contrast ads mention at 
least two candidates (Geer 2006). The authors found that even though positive campaign 
ads increased reports of intending to vote, a decrease in intention to vote was found with 
exposure to negative campaign ads. The authors concluded that their observation of the 
dearth of positive campaign ads meant that the effects of exposure to negative campaign 
ads was more influential and counteracted what good the positive ads did.  
A flurry of research was conducted that repudiated these experimental findings. 
Finkel and Geer (1998) employed a measure of aggregate advertising tone based on a net 
percentage of positive and negative ads and found that turns towards negativity in 
advertising tone did not affect aggregate turnout in the way that Ansolabehere, et. al. 
(1994) observed. At the individual level, Finkel and Geer (1998) found that negative 
advertising did not have a statistically significant effect on an individual’s propensity to 
vote once other factors influencing the likelihood of voting were controlled for. Geer 
(2006) expands the analysis of negativity to presidential and congressional campaigns 
and develops a theory of the informational content of negative campaign advertising. 
Negative campaign ads feature a higher level of issue content and information because 
negative attacks against a candidate require a greater amount of supporting information. 
Brader (2006) also shows that emotional appeals in advertisements, especially those 
incorporating fear and anxiety, increase the likelihood that an individual will recall 
information from the ad over ads that are less emotionally charged. Besides evidence 
used to support Geer’s (2006) and Brader’s (2006) claims, other studies have failed to 
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find support for the conclusions of the Ansolabehere and Iyengar studies that negative 
advertising has deleterious effects on voter behavior (Wattenberg and Brians 1999, Lau 
and Pomper 2001).  This pattern of discrepant findings about the negativity of campaign 
advertising is also present in the literature on judicial elections.  
While differences in tone may evidence differences in the effective transmission of the 
messages and information contained in an advertisement to an individual, another line of 
research has reinforced the informational potential of campaign ads in general. Previous 
work using various measures of advertising exposure has shown that as an individual’s 
exposure to political advertising increases, so does their recall of information about the 
advertisements (Ridout, Shah, Goldstein, and Franz 2004. Extrapolating their study, 
Franz, Freedman, Goldstein, and Ridout (2008) develop a theory of campaign advertising 
acting as informational supplements that increase the stores of political information 
among individuals. The aggregate campaign advertising environment influences what 
information is disseminated to individuals, while the characteristics of an individual, such 
as their television consumption and political behavior, affect what ads are seen and what 
information is gleaned from them. The authors find that increased exposure to advertising 
has marginal effects for individuals with great stores of political information, but the 
effect for individuals with low levels of political information is quite dramatic (Ridout, 
et. al. 2004, Franz, et. al. 2008). Additional extensions of this research program have 
shown that differences in institutions shape the political advertising environment, such as 
whether a race is for an executive or legislative office, and thus the subsequent process of 
exposure and information absorption (Ridout and Franz 2011). Succinctly, the 
institutional context of a campaign affects the advertising environment, which in turn 
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affects what messages are available for reception by an individual based on their personal 
characteristics. I expect this process holds for campaign advertising in judicial elections, 
but is modified according to the advertising environment in judicial elections.  
 
Campaign Advertising in Judicial Elections 
Campaign advertising is one of many features of contemporary judicial elections. 
In order to understand the advertising environment in judicial elections, it is important to 
contextualize it within the broader institutional setting of judicial elections. Differences in 
institutional design create differences in the kinds of ad campaigns that candidates for 
judicial office can run and will influence how and what messages are sent to voters to 
base their decisions off of, as is the case in legislative and executive races (Ridout and 
Franz 2011) . Not every state uses elections to staff the members of its courts. Twelve out 
of fifty states utilize an appointment process, whether gubernatorial or legislative, for 
their supreme court justices. Moreover, the use of electoral systems for selecting judges is 
not uniform. Seven states use partisan elections, in which candidates affiliate with a 
political party and appear on ballots as such. Fifteen states use nonpartisan elections, 
which means their names appear on the ballot unencumbered with a partisan 
identification. Over time an increasing number of states have opted for a merit-based 
selection system colloquially known as the Missouri Plan, which combines elements of 
an electoral and appointment selection system. Judges are appointed through procedures 
that vary across state, but ultimately they face retention elections in which voters can 
select to retain or not retain the judge. Currently the hybrid appointment-retention 
election system is the most common, with sixteen states utilizing it (Hall 2015).  
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The advertising environment differences among these types of judicial selection 
systems reveals an interesting pattern. Overall, positive, promotional content is the most 
common type of advertising content and these ads are more likely to contain traditional 
appeals based on experience and qualifications than contrast or attack ads (Salamone, et. 
al. 2014; Hall 2015). Candidates for judicial office may refrain from engaging in negative 
campaigning due to the potential detrimental effects it has on the public’s perception of 
the institutional legitimacy of the courts (Gibson 2008a; 2008b; 2009; Salamone, et. al. 
2014). In lower courts, White did not dramatically alter the rhetoric of candidates, with 
traditional themes of experience and qualification remaining the preferred message 
(Arbour and McKenzie 2011).  In terms of the proportions of races featuring negative 
advertising, partisan elections have the lowest ratio of negative advertising. However, 
when a total volume measure of advertisements aired is employed, partisan elections 
feature the highest volume of attack advertising, leading Hall (2015) to conclude that 
“when televised advertising is introduced, partisan elections are nastier” when compared 
to nonpartisan and retention elections (80).  
The Justice at Stake Campaign derides partisan elections of state Supreme Court 
judges, drawing their conclusion from aggregate summary evidence that suggests a 
partisan race evidences greater levels of fundraising and spending by candidates. These 
funds are primarily used to pay for the airing of television advertisements and media 
consultants that create them. It is the fundraising by judges that is so concerning, as these 
authors make the assumption that in order to attract funds for their campaigns judges 
must demonstrate a partiality on issues that corresponds with the preferences of would-be 
donors. To that end, the New Politics of Judicial Elections series has championed public 
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funding of judicial campaigns and advocates for the use of the three alternatives to 
partisan elections, while ultimately preferring the elimination of the election of judges 
altogether (Goldberg, et. al. 2002; Goldberg and Sanchez 2004; Goldberg, et. al. 2005; 
Sample, et. al. 2007; Sample, et. al. 2010; Bannon, et. al. 2013; Greytak, et. al. 2015). A 
recent study comparing the influence of candidate quality on electoral outcomes found in 
a similar vein that the effect of candidate quality on electoral outcomes was diminished in 
partisan races, where voters rely on partisan cues (Lim and Snyder 2015).  
However, many scholars do not find negative effects from partisan elections. Hall 
(2001) found that the murder rate had a negative effect on the vote share of incumbents in 
partisan state supreme court races, concluding that an increase in crime rates resulted in a 
lower incumbent vote share because voters were holding the public official, in this case a 
state supreme court justice, accountable for performance on a matter of public policy 
which they believed, not unreasonably, was under the control of that official. Running a 
partisan electoral system for selecting judges also increases the chance that a quality 
challenger will appear and quality challengers tend to do better than non-quality 
challengers, which runs counter to the notion of reform advocates that nonpartisan and 
retention systems are better for selecting qualified judges (Bonneau and Hall 2003; Hall 
and Bonneau 2006). Moreover, an analysis of how qualified candidates perform in 
judicial elections reveals that partisan judicial selection systems result in the election of 
qualified candidates at a rate similar to other systems (Savchak 2015). Partisan electoral 
systems have higher levels of voter participation as measured by a decrease in ballot roll-
off, which occurs when voters do not complete their entire ballots and leave offices 
further down the ballot blank (Hall 2007). Running in a partisan race decreases the 
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amount of money raised and spent by a candidate, the implication being that in 
nonpartisan and retention elections candidates must do more personal solicitation because 
they lack the fundraising support of a party system (Bonneau 2005; Bonneau 2007; 
Bonneau and Cann 2011). Finally, attack advertising appears to only be effective at 
reducing incumbent vote share in nonpartisan elections (Hall 2015). Thus, the effects of 
campaign advertising might be more pronounced in nonpartisan elections and campaigns 
in nonpartisan elections might rely more heavily on campaign advertising to compensate 
for the unavailability of partisan appeals. 
These results are focused on the aggregate-level effects of differences in electoral 
systems on the advertising environment, but there have been calls for more data at the 
individual level in judicial elections (Streb 2009). What is known about campaign 
advertising and institutions in judicial elections at the individual level paints a somewhat 
different picture of the influence of electoral systems. Partisan cues appearing beside a 
judicial candidate’s name on a ballot are utilized by voters to help them reach a choice 
between judicial candidates, and when these are absent there are lower levels of 
participation because voters lack the requisite information to cast what they perceive as a 
meaningful vote (Dubois 1979; Hojnacki and Baum 1991; Lim and Snyder 2015). 
Campaign advertisements in nonpartisan and judicial elections thus will not feature any 
cues to that effect, and instead utilize other types of appeals. McKenzie, Rugeley, and 
Unger (2015) investigate the individual-level effects of the two most common types of 
appeals outside of partisan cues in judicial elections: experience and policy promotion. 
Of these two the authors find that appeals to experience by an experienced candidate, 
which they define as having twenty years of legal experience with ten years as a judge, 
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result in the most positive support from voters. They also find that inexperienced 
candidates, although not scoring as well as experienced candidates, can augment their 
favorability with voters by making appeals to salient policy issues. When qualifications 
are the only appeal made to voters, then, the tone of that appeal and how the 
qualifications are presented will matter a great deal. 
The claims of the reformers that judicial elections are becoming more political 
and less focused on selecting qualified candidates is echoed in the McKenzie, et. al. 
(2015) study and in content analysis of judicial campaign ads that shows an increasing 
prevalence in ads with criminal justice and public safety themes (Salamone, et. al. 2014; 
Greytak, et. al. 2015). Judicial elections are low-information races and most voters will 
not have a great deal of information to utilize in making their decision (Baum 1987; 
Iyengar 2001/2002; Bam 2013). Though the Justice at Stake Campaign has advocated for 
measures like the circulation of candidate guides, the literature on campaign advertising 
in the other branches shows that campaign ads can and do inform voters about elections, 
even negative ones filled with emotionally provocative appeals (Franz, et. al. 2008; Geer 
2006; Brader 2006). However, it is still unclear whether these effects hold at the level of 
the individual voter in judicial elections. This study will address this question by utilizing 
a methodology that is designed to examine the individual-level effects of the differences 
in campaign advertising tone on measures of voter behavior, like recall of information, 









The following section describes the methods used to test the hypotheses that 
emerge from my review of the literature on campaign advertising and its place in 
contemporary elections for state judicial office. I utilize an experimental method of 
televised advertisement manipulation inspired by Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) and 
later studies. Subjects’ post-viewing questionnaires are designed to provide basic 
demographic, media consumption, and political knowledge and attentiveness measures 
for control variables, as well as three questions relevant to my primary independent and 
dependent variables. I proceed with an outline of my theory and a formal statement of my 
hypotheses.  
 
Theoretical Expectations and Hypotheses 
Rather than discounting political campaign advertisements as an inadequate 
format for transmitting substantive, relevant information to voters, Franz, et. al. (2008) 
propose a theory of campaign advertisements as “informational supplements” that serve 
to enhance the pool of information available to voters as they make their decisions (16). 
For many voters, a campaign advertisement they see in the course of their normal media 
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consumption may be the only source of information about a particular candidate they 
receive. Thus, I expect that exposure to the political advertisement in my study will 
transmit relevant information to my subjects.  
Beyond simply being able to communicate information to viewers, I have other 
more specific expectations about the influence of my advertisements. Geer (2006) 
postulates that negative advertising, by jarring viewers with its aggressive tone, provokes 
a more thoughtful response from viewers than pat promotional advertisements, and 
viewers are more likely to recall features of negative advertisements. Whatever effect 
negativity has on candidate evaluation or voter mobilization, the message and the 
information contained within is sent more strongly in a negative advertisement. While I 
expect subject recall of the relevant information in the advertisement to be present in both 
treatment groups, this prior work leads me expect a higher rate of recall of the correct 
number of years the candidate in the ad has in the negative advertisement treatment group 
relative to the positive advertisement treatment group. 
H1: Subjects in the negative advertisement treatment group will 
have higher levels of recall relative to subjects in the positive 
advertisement treatment group. 
How might individuals that pay more attention to politics, or those that have 
higher levels of general knowledge about politics, respond to the advertisement? Zaller’s 
(1992) receive, accept, sample (RAS) model of opinion formation would suggest that 
individuals with the greatest cognitive abilities, as evidenced by their stores of political 
information, would be the most likely to recall specific information. Franz, et. al. (2008) 
counter this notion with an assertion that it is the individuals with the least amount of 
attention to and information about politics that are the most likely to receive new 
information from a political campaign advertisement. Both mechanisms have received 
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empirical support, and are intuitively appealing. However, one does not seem to rule out 
the other and both could be at play in the present study. In the end these different forces 
are likely to mostly cancel each other out, leaving no significant difference between more 
and less attentive, knowledgeable, and news consuming subjects. 
H2: There will be no significant difference in the levels of recall 
based on a subject’s attention to politics, level of political information, 
and news consumption. 
Self-identified partisans and ideologues are also more likely to pay attention to 
politics in general compared to individuals that do not identify with these political 
identities according to the RAS model (Zaller 1992). This means that regardless of which 
party or ideology an individual identifies with, they will have greater cognitive 
engagement with the material contained in the ad by virtue of their identification with a 
political belief system. Accordingly, I generate two hypotheses dealing with self-
identified partisanship and ideology. 
 H3: Subjects identifying with one of the two major political parties 
will be more likely to recall features of the advertisement than subjects not 
identifying with one of the two major political parties in both treatment 
groups. 
 H4: Subjects identifying themselves with one dimension or another 
of the liberal- conservative ideological scale will be more likely to recall 
features of the advertisement  than subjects not identifying with a 
dimension in both treatment groups. 
It is also important to consider what effects the advertisements might have on 
voter behavior and candidate evaluations because these two dynamics bear directly on 
who wins in elections and what strategy they use to achieve that victory. Hall (2015), 
using aggregate data on campaign advertising and electoral returns in state supreme court 
races, finds that candidates subject to negative attack advertisements in nonpartisan races 
receive fewer votes. Many within the legal community that advocate for reforms in 
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judicial elections also note the potential for negative attack advertising to adversely affect 
electoral outcomes, like incumbent vote share or voter participation (Greytak, et.al. 2015, 
Bannon, et al. 2012). Most of these claims are based on evidence at the aggregate level, 
and when individual level data, such as survey responses, are used to investigate the 
relationship between advertising and voter behavior, the advertising measure is aggregate 
as well. Previous studies have assumed the individual-level effects based on aggregate 
campaign advertising, but do not directly link an ad with a set of voters. Accordingly, I 
generate two hypotheses to test the individual level effects of negative advertising on 
voter perceptions of candidates for judicial office. 
 H5: Subjects in the negative advertisement treatment group will be 
less likely to evaluate the candidate as qualified than subjects in the 
positive advertisement treatment group. 
 H6: Subjects in the negative advertisement treatment group will be 
less likely to report being willing to vote for the candidate than subjects in 
the positive advertisement treatment group. 
Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 address whether or not the effects of campaign advertising in 
executive and legislative races apply in the context of a judicial election. Hypotheses 1, 5, 
and 6 are structured to answer questions about the effects of negative advertising in 
judicial elections. With these six hypotheses in hand, I turn to a discussion of the 
experimental method and data I gather to test their claims.  
 
The Advertisement 
Following the experimental designs of previous studies, I utilized a fictional 
campaign advertisement as my manipulation. There are three generally accepted 
categories for the tone, or overall valence of campaign advertisements: positive, negative, 
and contrast. Positive advertisements contain a message that promotes a single candidate, 
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while a negative advertisement attacks or criticizes a particular candidate. Contrast ads 
can feature both positive and negative elements, but the feature that distinguishes a 
contrast ad from positive and negative ads is that it focuses on at least two candidates 
(Hall 2015). Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) investigated the different effects of 
positively and negatively toned ads on viewers evaluations of the candidates and their 
self-reported intention to vote by manipulating the wording in key parts of the script of a 
campaign advertisement to create a positive and negative version, while holding all aural 
and visual elements of the advertisement constant except for a single graphic. 
Following these general guidelines, I commissioned a campaign advertisement for 
a fictional candidate for a state supreme court seat from Orange House, a division of 
Oklahoma State University’s School of Media and Strategic Communications where 
students produce advertisements for businesses and other clients. The full script for the 
campaign advertisement can be found in the appendices, but here I will discuss some 
relevant features. Ronald Duncan is the name of the fictional candidate, which I chose for 
the similarity of letters in the first and last names. I conducted searches on Google and 
Ballotpedia.org and to the best of my knowledge this name does not belong to any real 
candidate for elective office, judicial or otherwise. Two versions of the advertisement 
were created, one that promoted the candidate and one that attacked the candidate, 
creating positive and negative treatment groups. Both versions were approximately :48 
seconds in length, which is more than half again as long as the typical campaign 
advertisement but not outside the realm of possible lengths of campaign advertisements.  
I did not utilize a control group for two reasons. First, I am interested in the different 
recall ability of those individuals that actually see advertisements. If a voter is not 
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exposed to an advertisement about a candidate, they will have no ability to recall 
information about the candidate that was featured in the ad. Second, this would likely 
take the form of a contrast ad and necessarily mean the inclusion of a second fictional 
candidate, which would complicate my analysis of the recall of information about a 
single candidate and their qualifications. As such, using only a positive and a negative 
version of the ad best allows me to test my research questions. 
The differences between the positive and negative versions of the advertisement 
come down to a few key wording changes and whether the ad recommends voting or not 
voting for the candidate. In both versions, the candidate is described as having five years 
of experience as a judge on a state appellate court. Definitions of a qualified candidate 
vary by study, but at a minimum qualified candidates are expected to have previous 
experience relevant to the office they are running for (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 
1985, Bonneau 2001, Bonneau and Hall 2003, Hall and Bonneau 2006, Lim and Snyder 
2015, McKenzie, Rugeley, and Unger 2015, Savchak 2015). The positive version 
promotes the candidate as qualified based on this experience: 
 “Judge Ronald Duncan has served our community for 5 years as a state appeals 
court judge. 
 
 Judge Duncan has the proven ability we need for our courts.” 
 
The negative version of the ad, on the other hand, portrays this experience as insufficient: 
 “Judge Ronald Duncan has only served 5 years as a state appeals court judge. 
 Ronald Duncan does not have the proven ability we need for our courts.” 
The phrase “our community” is omitted in the negative version, as this language is 
inclusive and thus promotional in tone, and the candidate is referred to by their full name 
rather than with the pre-nominal “judge” followed by their last name, as this is consistent 
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with the negative characterization of the candidate as unqualified. The negative ad thus 
concludes by encouraging the viewer to not vote for the fictional candidate: 
 “This November, don’t give Ronald Duncan your vote for our state supreme 
court.” 
Here again, the “judge” is dropped from the candidate’s name, while in the positive 
version it reappears and the word “don’t” is omitted: 
 “This November, give your vote to Judge Ronald Duncan for our state supreme 
court.” 
The final manipulated element is rather minor. In the positive version, as the 
recommendation message is announced a checkmark appears beside the candidate’s name. 
In the negative version, a red “X” appears across the candidate’s name. 
There is one final note to make about the design of the advertisement. Ansolabehere and 
Iyengar (1995) explicitly endorse realism as a guiding principle in their experimental 
design. To this end, they nested their advertisements in a much longer televised segment 
viewed by participants that included other types of programming besides their campaign 
advertisement. Video campaign advertisements were overwhelmingly disseminated this 
way in the early 1990s media environment of the Ansolabehere and Iyengar studies. The 
2016 media landscape has numerous channels for the dissemination of campaign 
advertisements as stand-alone content, not the least of which are social media platforms 
like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. For this reason, I chose not to embed the 
advertisement in a longer segment with other content. Additionally, I chose not to include 




Sample Population and Recruitment  
Subjects were recruited from the sample population of 872 students enrolled in 
sections of POLS 1113: Introduction to American Government featuring Friday 
discussion sections led by teaching assistants at Oklahoma State University in the spring 
semester of 2016. There were a total of twenty-five sections spread across three class 
times. I alternated positive and negative treatments going down a numeric list of the 
twenty-five sections so that there were positive and negative treatments in each of the 
time periods. A total of 709 students participated in the study after they were recruited by 
their teaching assistants according to a script that can be found in the appendices. No 
inducements of any kind were offered for participation, and a student’s grade in the 
course was unaffected by their decision to participate or not. This point was 
overemphasized so as to mitigate any coercion that students may have felt from being 
asked by their teaching assistants, who were in positions of authority, to participate in the 
study. 
The primary reason for selecting this sample population was their availability and 
ease of access. The course is required of all students at Oklahoma State University, which 
means the sample represents a good cross-section of the University student population, 
and the sections with Friday discussion sections led by undergraduate and graduate 
teaching assistants feature a more flexible instruction schedule than other sections. 
Moreover, being one of these teaching assistants myself, I was able to easily coordinate 
the dissemination of study training, instructions, and materials to all the individuals 
responsible for administering the study. Although the vast majority of the students are 
between the ages of 18 and 20 and are freshmen or sophomores, this homogeneity serves 
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two functions. While realism was the guiding principle in the construction of the ad, an 
experienced political observer would be capable of discerning the artificial nature of the 
advertisement. The relative lack of experience of these students means they are perhaps 
less able to identify the artificial nature of the advertisement. Additionally the 
homogeneity of the sample population serves as an added control in the experiment for 
demographic factors like age, race, and gender that might complicate the causal 
inferences from the manipulated tone of the advertisement. 
Of the 709 students that participated, a total of 652 post-viewing questionnaires were 
usable for analysis. Despite clear instructions and including options for not knowing the 
correct response to a question and preferring not to respond to a question, some 
questionnaires were unusable. 57 observations were dropped for a variety of reasons, 
including two responses to a question, blank responses, writing in of responses not 
featured on the questionnaire, and unclear or ambiguous marks. Even when these issues 
were not present in a question used for data on my independent and dependent variables, 
the entire questionnaire was nevertheless thrown out of the analysis. I only wanted to use 
surveys where participants fully understood what was required for their participation and 
gave it willingly on each question. Of the usable questionnaires 314 came from subjects 
that were exposed to the negative version of the ad, while 338 came from subjects that 
were exposed to the positive version of the ad. These groups are of sufficient size to 
allow for multivariate tests of my hypotheses. 
The Post-Viewing Questionnaire 
To construct the variables necessary to test my hypotheses, I administered a post-
viewing questionnaire that was the same for the positive and negative advertisement 
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treatment groups. Since students were randomly assigned to the positive or negative 
treatment group, any differences between the questionnaires should be attributable to the 
treatment itself. The questionnaire has a total of twenty questions and the full version can 
be found in the appendices. There are questions for age, gender, race, family income, and 
state of origin for controls. There are four questions related to the ad, two asking about 
recall of the advertisement and two candidate evaluation questions, to test my hypotheses. 
There are additional questions gauging political knowledge, self-reported measures of 
news consumption on the internet, television, and radio, a self-reported measure of 
attention to politics, political party affiliation, and ideological identification. The 
questions for political knowledge, race, news consumption, attention to politics, and 
political behavior all came from the American National Election Study pre-election 
questionnaire for 2012. 
My primary dependent variable is Recall of Information, which is dichotomously 
coded as a 1 if the subject selected the correct response of “1-5 years of experience” to 
the corresponding question on the post-viewing questionnaire. All other responses were 
coded as a 0. Another dependent variable is Recall of Theme, which is dichotomously 
coded as a 1 if the subject was able to correctly identify the theme of the ad as being 
about the candidate’s experience and qualifications. There are two other dependent 
variables, Evaluation of Qualification and Likely to Vote. Evaluation of Qualification is 
an ordinal variable with evaluations of “Well Qualified” coded as a 2, evaluations of 
“Qualified” were coded as a 1, evaluations of “No Preference” were coded as a 0, and 
evaluations of “Not Qualified” were coded as a -1. Likely to Vote is an ordinal variable 
coded as a 2 if the respondent reported being “Very Likely” to vote for the candidate, 
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coded as a 1 if the respondent was “Somewhat Likely” to vote for the candidate, a 0 if 
they indicated no preference, a -1 if they were “Somewhat Unlikely” to vote for the 
candidate and a -2 if they selected being “Very Unlikely” to vote for the candidate.  
My primary independent variable is Tone of Ad, coded as a 1 if the subject was 
exposed to the negative version of the campaign advertisement and coded as a 0 if the 
subject was exposed to the positive version of the ad. To test the relationships in my other 
hypotheses, I create several other independent variables. Attention to Politics is ordinal 
and coded as a 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 based on their self-reported attention to news about 
government and politics, with “None at all” coded as a 0 and “A great deal” coded as a 4. 
Political Knowledge is also an ordinal code based on the total responses correct to three 
questions, with values ranging from 0 to 3. The first question asks what the limit on how 
many terms the President can serve, while a second question asks how many years are in 
one full term for a U.S. Senator. A final question asks for a simple definition of the 
Medicare, with the correct response indicating that the program supports healthcare for 
the elderly. I identify three types of media consumption as independent variables, News 
on the Internet, News on TV, and News on Radio and each subject was coded according 
to how many days in a week they utilized that medium for news consumption, with 
values ranging from 0 to 7. 
There are two other independent variables for political party identification and 
ideological identification. Party ID is based on the subjects’ response to a question about 
which political party they identify with. The question only asked for an identification and 
did not have options for indicating the strength of that affiliation. If the subject identified 
with one of the two major political parties, then they were coded as a 1. All other 
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responses were coded as 0s. Ideological ID is coded under an ordinal scheme of absolute 
ideological distance from a moderate position, with responses of extreme liberalism and 
conservatism yielding scores of 3, while slight liberal and conservative identification is 
coded as a 1.  
On the right hand side, Recall of Information is used to test hypotheses H1 
through H4, while Evaluation of Qualification is used to test H5 and Likely to Vote is 
used to test H6. On the left hand side, Tone of Ad is used to test H1, H2, H5, and H6. 
Attention to Politics, Political Knowledge, and News Consumption are used to test H2. 
H3 and H4 are tested with the independent variables Party ID and Ideological ID 
respectively. There are a variety of demographic control variables used in the tests of my 
hypotheses, including age, gender, race, and parental income. Additionally, I include an 
ordinal control variable for what time of day the subject’s section was held, with a 9:30 
a.m. time coded as a 1, a 10:30 a.m. time coded as a 2, and an 11:30 a.m. time coded as a 
3. The primary reason for doing so is the observation among the discussion section TAs 











In regards to the findings for my first hypothesis, the results are fairly clear. A 
good starting point for a discussion is Table 1, which shows a cross tabulation of my 
dependent variable Recall of Information with my independent variable Negative 
Treatment. A quick glance shows a much higher proportion of recall in the negative 
treatment group than the positive treatment group, with 65.9% of respondents in the 
negative treatment group successfully recalling the number of years of experience 
mentioned in the ad compared to 48.5% in the positive treatment group. For the entire 
sample, the percent that accurately recalled the information in the ad was 56.9%.  








174 107 281 
Correctly Recalled 
Information 
164 207 371 
Totals 338 314 652 
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I continued my analysis with a probit regression of Recall of Information, since 
that dependent variable is non-linear and violates the assumptions of an OLS regression. 
Collinearity of variables was checked for in this model, as well as all others. Generally 
speaking, my control variables are signed as expected. Table 2 shows the results of the 
first probit regression. Negative Treatment is both statistically significant at the .001 level 
and in the expected direction. This means that exposure to the negative advertisement 
made respondents more likely to recall the information about the candidate contained in 
the ad, which supports my first hypothesis. As for the substantive effect of Negative 
Treatment, I am confident that the results indicate a sizeable effect for the negative 
treatment on the probability of recall of information. As for the other variables, most 
failed to meet significance at even the .05 level. Interestingly, my control variable for 
race, which was dichotomously coded as a 1 for white and a 0 for all others, did meet this 
level of significance and the direction indicates that white respondents were more likely 
to recall the information contained in the ad.  
Table 2 offers mixed support for my second hypothesis, that there is no 
statistically significant difference in recall among respondents based on their attention to 
politics, their stores of political information, or their attention to the news. Political 
Knowledge was not significant, and neither was News on the Internet. However, Attention 
to Politics and News on TV, although not statistically significant at the .05 level, are 
significant at the .10 level and News on the Radio comes close to this level of 
significance. Considering the directions of the coefficients for these variables, Attention 
to Politics would appear to function as Zaller’s (1992) RAS model would predict in that 
higher levels of attention to politics correspond to a greater ability to perceive political 
33 
 
messages while News on TV indicates that higher levels of television news consumption 
functions to depress the recall of information contained in judicial campaign ads.  











.4536417 .101352 4.48 0.000 .2549953 .652288 
Political 
Knowledge 
.0500171 .0675007 .74 0.459 -.0822819 .182316 
Attention to 
Politics 
.1181716 .0667335 1.77 0.077 -.0126238 .2489669 
Party ID .0339791 .1190139 0.29 0.775 -.1992838 .267242 
Ideological 
ID 
.0161209 .0630497 0.26 0.798 -.1074543 .139696 
News on the 
Internet 
-.0119829 .0249625 -0.48 0.631 -.0609085 .0369426 
News on TV -.0651171 .0347241 -1.88 0.061 -.1331751 .0029408 
News on the 
Radio 
.0681726 .0421343 1.62 0.106 -.0144091 .1507543 
Section Time -.0291885 .0608991 -0.48 0.632 -.1485485 .0901715 
Gender -.1607874 .1007954 -1.60 0.111 -.3583428 .036768 
Age .1397326 .1576467 0.89 0.375 -.1692493 .4487145 
Parental 
Income 
-.0197149 .0293034 -0.67 0.501 -.0771486 .0377187 
Race .263082 .1134902 2.32 0.020 .0406453 .4855187 
Constant -.3822229 .3508794 -1.09 0.276 -1.069934 .3054881 
Number of Observations = 652, Log likelihood = -424.91942, Prob > chi2 = 0.0001,  
Pseudo R2 = 0.0466 
H3 and H4 receive considerably less support. Neither Party ID nor Ideological ID 
are statistically significant, and their standard errors are greater than their coefficients. 
The influence of Party ID and Ideological ID is minimal in the model for information 
processing presented here. Although this runs counter to the expectations of Zaller’s 
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(1992) RAS model, it is not entirely out of place in a judicial campaign ad featuring no 
partisan cues. Without those cues, the advantages in cognitive engagement that come 
with identifying with a party or political ideology might not be present. Moreover, this 
supports the findings of judicial politics scholars concerning the effects of an absence of 
partisan cues in some judicial elections (Dubois 1979, 1984, Savchak 2015, Lim and 
Snyder 2015). 











-.6963882 .0903777 -7.71 0.000 -.8735253 -.5192511 
Political 
Knowledge 
-.031999 .0593063 -0.54 0.590 -.1482371 .0842392 
Attention to 
Politics 
.0200254 .0584659 0.34 0.732 -.0945656 .1346164 
Party ID .0324231 .104379 0.31 0.756 -.1721561 .2370022 
Ideological 
ID 
-.076385 .0547844 -1.39 0.163 -.1837604 .0309905 
News on the 
Internet 
-.0191271 .022005 -0.87 0.385 -.0622561 .0240019 
News on TV .088431 .0301058 2.94 0.003 .0294246 .1474374 
News on the 
Radio 
-.0386238 .0356734 -1.08 0.279 -.1085424 .0312947 
Section Time -.0617751 .0532457 -1.16 0.246 -.1661349 .0425846 
Gender .0377386 .0882789 0.43 0.669 -.1352849 .2107622 
Age .0369188 .1290872 0.29 0.775 -.2160873 .289925 
Parental 
Income 
.0264515 .0256834 1.03 0.303 -.023887 .07679 
Race .1388737 .0993195 1.40 0.162 -.055789 .3335363 
Number of Observations = 652, Log likelihood = -714.19514, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000,  




Table 3 is the test of my fifth hypothesis, that the negative treatment group would 
be less likely to evaluate the candidate as qualified. The results here are fairly clear as 
well with regards to the effect of the negative advertising treatment, although not without 
some interesting highlights. An ordered probit regression was selected to test H5 because 
Evaluation of Qualification is an ordinal dependent variable with higher values indicating 
a higher evaluation of the candidate’s qualification. The result for Negative Treatment is 
significant at the .001 level and in the expected direction, indicating that exposure to the 
negative advertisement resulted in a greater probability of evaluating the candidate as 
unqualified. Since the qualification of the candidate was the same in both versions, this 
means that voters might remember the information contained in negative ads better, but 
the framing of that information can affect their opinions and assessments of a candidate. 
Curiously, News on TV was significant at the .01 level and in a positive direction. I am 
not certain what causal mechanism is at play here, except that higher levels of television 
consumption of news may be measuring a latent process in regards to passive acceptance 
of persuasive messages.  
I test my final hypothesis with another ordered probit model, since Likely to Vote 
is an ordinal variable. The results of that test are found in Table 4. Again, the effects of 
the negative treatment are quite definitive. Negative Treatment is both statistically 
significant and in the expected direction. This means that subjects exposed to the negative 
treatment were less likely to vote for the candidate in the negative ad even though they 
were the same candidate. This offers some support of Hall’s (2015) finding that negative 
advertising depresses incumbent vote share in nonpartisan races. News on TV is also 
statistically significant, in this instance meaning that higher levels of television news 
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consumption increase the probability of being likely to vote for the fictional candidate. 
News on the Internet is significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test, but in a direction 
that suggests sourcing news from the internet decreases the probability being likely to 
vote for the candidate. The control variable for gender identification is also significant at 
the .05 level in a one-tailed test, indicating that female-identifying respondents were less 
likely to vote for the candidate.  











-.4836378 .0869056 -5.57 0.000 -.6539696 -.3133061 
Political 
Knowledge 
.0139203 .0568396 0.24 0.807 -.0974832 .1253238 
Attention to 
Politics 
-.0538742 .0566386 -0.95 0.342 -.1648838 .0571355 
Party ID -.1200521 .1008368 -1.19 0.234 -.3176887 .0775844 
Ideological 
ID 
-.021796 .0528738 -0.41 0.680 -.1254268 .0818349 
News on the 
Internet 
-.0360413 .0211533 -1.70 0.088 -.0775011 .0054185 
News on TV .0639501 .0291691 2.19 0.028 .0067798 .1211205 
News on the 
Radio 
-.0232188 .0343933 -0.68 0.500 -.0906285 .0441908 
Section Time .0119024 .0513956 0.23 0.817 -.0888312 .112636 
Gender -.1617774 .0851918 -1.90 0.058 -.3287502 .0051954 
Age -.0519188 .1257464 -0.41 0.680 -.2983772 .1945396 
Parental 
Income 
.0170378 .0247847 0.69 0.492 -.0315394 .065615 
Race .1541576 .0963351 1.60 0.110 -.0346557 .3429709 
Number of Observation = 652, Log likelihood = -763.274, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000,  
















.640501 .0553728 11.57 0.000 .5319722 .7490297 
Negative 
Treatment 
-.197335 .0919277 -2.15 0.032 -.37751 -.01716 
Political 
Knowledge 
.0267039 .0579802 0.46 0.645 -.0869351 .140343 
Attention to 
Politics 
-.0648503 .0579324 -1.12 0.263 -.1783957 .0486951 
Party ID -.1615099 .1029859 -1.57 0.117 -.3633586 .0403388 
Ideological 
ID 
.0163219 .0540938 0.30 0.763 -.0897 .1223438 
News on the 
Internet 
-.0320235 .0216057 -1.48 0.138 -.0743698 .0103229 
News on TV .0300648 .0299657 1.00 0.316 -.0286669 .0887965 
News on the 
Radio 
-.0108898 .0350775 -0.31 0.756 -.0796404 .0578609 
Section Time .0501626 .0525889 0.95 0.340 -.0529098 .1532351 
Gender -.1984016 .0870917 -2.28 0.023 -.3690983 -.027705 
Age -.0871922 .1280181 -0.68 0.496 -.3381032 .1637187 
Parental 
Income 
.0082811 .0253067 0.33 0.743 -.0413191 .0578813 
Race .1167954 .0983975 1.19 0.235 -.0760601 .3096509 
Number of Observation = 652, Log likelihood = -693.30858, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000,  
Pseudo R2 = 0.1203 
Given the close link between positive evaluations of candidates and likelihood of 
voting for them, I estimated a second model to test H6 that included Evaluation of 
Qualification as an independent variable. The results of that regression are in Table 5. 
Grabbing the attention is the decreased significance of Negative Treatment in this model, 
although still meeting the .05 level. It is still in the expected direction indicating that 
exposure to the negative treatment decreased the probability of a respondent reporting 
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that they would be likely to vote for the candidate. The results in Table 5 indicate that 
Evaluation of Qualification is statistically significant, and in the expected direction as an 
independent variable for Likely to Vote. Higher evaluations of the qualifications of the 
candidate increase the probability of being likely to vote for the candidate. This is not a 
surprising result and speaks to the general finding in political science that positive 
evaluations of candidates enhance the likelihood of an individual voting for them. 
An interesting result is the effect of gender in both models. Gender was 
categorically coded as a 0 for no identification, a 1 for a male identification, and a 2 for a 
female identification. In the first model, the effect achieved significance at the .10 level, 
and in the second model it achieves .05 level significance. What is most captivating is the 
direction of the relationship; apparently female-identifying subjects were less likely to 
vote for the fictional male candidate Ronald Duncan. It seems that there is a gender gap 
in being likely to vote for the candidate. However, the mean response for the Likely to 
Vote question was a value between 0 and -1, so overall the candidate was not very likely 
to be voted for. 
Across all of the models, the tone of the advertisement was a statistically 
significant predictor of the various independent variables. Negative Treatment resulted in 
higher levels of recall of information, lower evaluations of the qualifications of the 
candidate, and a lower likelihood of voting for the candidate. Even when Evaluation of 
Qualification was included as an independent variable, Negative Treatment retained its 
statistical significance. 
Other explanatory variables received mixed support. Political Knowledge failed to 
produce higher levels of recall and had no effect in evaluations of the candidate. 
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However, Attention to Politics was significant at the .10 level in affecting the probability 
of the recall of information and given the coefficient suggests that higher levels of 
attention to politics result in a higher probability of recalling the information contained in 
judicial campaign ads. In regards to news consumption, an interesting pattern emerges. 
Higher levels of television news consumption negatively affected the recall of 
information from the ad, but made a respondent more positive in their evaluations of the 
candidate’s qualifications and more likely to vote for the candidate. In contrast, higher 
levels of internet news consumption had no statistically significant effect on recall, but 
did make a respondent less likely to favorably evaluate the qualifications of the candidate 
and less likely to vote for the candidate. The effects of campaign advertising depend not 
only on how much media you consume, but also what type. Furthermore, avid internet 
news consumers appear to be more skeptical of campaign advertising messages than 
television news gluttons. 
While H2, H1, H5, and H6 all receive support, H3 and H4 do not. Party ID and 
Ideological ID were both insignificant in my model for information recall. Identification 
with a political party or ideology might demonstrate an engagement with politics, but not 
necessarily the kind of cognitive engagement that would automatically make an 
individual more likely to recall the information contained in campaign advertisements. 
However, given that the context of the advertisement was a judicial election and lacked 
any partisan clues, this finding supports the notion that the presence of those cues can 
help voters make decisions. Moreover, when they are absent these identities are not 









I am confident that the results of this study speak to the power of negative 
campaign advertising specifically and the importance of advertising tone in general. The 
tone of the ad was manipulated in a few, subtle ways, but those manipulations were 
enough to produce significant differences in recall of information, evaluations of the 
candidate, and propensity to vote for the candidate among participants exposed to the 
positive and negative versions of the ad. Although a single ad cannot represent the entire 
advertising environment of a real election for judicial office, in such low-information 
races a single ad may be the difference between an informed electorate and an 
uninformed one, or victory or defeat. 
Caution is warranted in regard to drawing generalizable conclusions about 
individual-level voter behavior in judicial elections based on the results of this study 
given the experimental design utilized here. No doubt the external validity of such a 
study is limited. The campaign advertisement and the candidate mentioned therein were 
fictional and the sample of participants was far from representative of electorates in 
judicial elections. Although I am fairly confident in the measures developed from my 




potentially uncaptured with regards to news consumed on television versus the internet, 
race, and gender. 
Caution is also warranted in terms of the normative implications of this study. 
Although exposure to the negative advertisement did increase the probability of recalling 
the information, it also increased the probability of negatively evaluating the 
qualifications of the candidate and the probability of being unlikely to vote for the 
candidate. While negative advertising can be more informative, it can also serve to 
mislead voters; the same information was presented about the candidate in my study, but 
a negatively toned presentation of this information had a significant effect on perceptions 
of the candidate. 
The context of my study also matters a great deal for the normative implications 
for the use of negative advertising in judicial elections. The advertisement in my study 
contained correct, factual information about the fictional candidate. This will certainly 
not always be the case in the real political world. Indeed, negative advertisements may 
often feature inaccurate or misleading information that, coupled with the negative tone, is 
entirely designed to firmly plant unflattering, but untrue information about a candidate in 
the minds of voters with the intent to dissuade them from voting for the targeted 
candidate. To the extent that reliable information is contained in negative campaign 
advertisements in judicial elections, the presence of negative campaign advertising can 
enhance the democratic accountability function of judicial elections. However, even 
reliable information can be manipulated by a negatively toned advertisement to mislead 
voters, as the results of this study demonstrate. There are plenty of incentives for the 
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sponsors of real campaign advertisements to use elements of negative advertising to 
distort correct information presented in an ad. 
The responsiveness to the effects of negative campaign advertising is also 
dependent upon the individual-level characteristics of the voter receiving the message. 
The type of media one consumes will moderate the effects of adverting tone of and the 
appeals made within a campaign advertisement. My sample was undergraduate college 
students who were for the most part no more than twenty years old. The electorate in 
judicial contests is quite different from my sample, and so negative appeals might be 
even more effective in the actual population of voters in judicial elections. 
Negative advertising has an informative effect, but with this great power comes 
great responsibility. Campaign staff, political consultants, and the clients they serve can 
use negative advertising to effectively get their messages across to voters, but what that 
message is sent, and whether it is accurate or not will shape how helpful or harmful 
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 Below is a copy of the script that was used to create the campaign advertisement 










































 Nowhere is this more important than in our courts, where more and more, judicial 
 decisions are shaping how Americans live our lives. 
VIDEO: 
 














 Judge Ronald Duncan has served our community for 5 years as a state appeals court 
 judge. 
 












 A closing note at the bottom of the screen reads “PAID FOR BY LIBERTY AND 
















 Judge Ronald Duncan has only served 5 years as a state appeals court judge. 
 












 A closing note at the bottom of the screen reads “PAID FOR BY LIBERTY AND 










































































 For the following questions, please place an “X” in the box beside 
the option that best matches your response. Keep in mind that all your 
responses are confidential and completely anonymous. Please select 
only one option unless otherwise indicated. Please complete the 
questions in sequence.  
 
Question #1 
Which of the following best describes your age? 
[  ] 18—20 
[  ] 21—24 
[  ] 25—29 
[  ] 30+ 
[  ] Prefer not to respond 
 
Question #2: 
How do you identify your gender? 
[  ] Female 
[  ] Male 
[  ] Other:___________________________ 
[  ] Prefer not to respond 
 
Question #3: 
What state are you from? 
[  ] Oklahoma 
[  ] A U.S. state bordering Oklahoma (Texas, Kansas, Arkansas, Missouri, New Mexico, 
Colorado) 
[  ] A U.S. State not bordering Oklahoma 
[  ] Outside the U.S. 
[  ] Unsure 
[  ] Prefer not to respond 
 
Question #4: 
Which of the following categories best describes your parent(s) annual income? 
[  ] Less than $25,000 
[  ] $25,000—$49,999 
[  ] $50,000—$74,999 
[  ] $75,000—$119,000 
[  ] $120,000 or more 
[  ] Unsure/don’t know 








Do you happen to know if you receive a full or partial Pell Grant award? 
[  ] I do receive a full or partial Pell Grant award 
[  ] I do not receive a full or partial Pell Grant award 
[  ] Unsure/don’t know 
[  ] Prefer not to respond  
 
Question #6: 
Do you consider yourself Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino? 
[  ] Yes 
[  ] No 
[  ] Unsure/don’t know 
[  ] Prefer not to respond  
 
Question #7: 
What race do you consider yourself to be? Please select any that apply for this 
question. 
[  ] White or Caucasian 
[  ] Black or African-American 
[  ] American Indian or Alaskan Native 
[  ] Asian 
[  ] Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
[  ] None 
[  ] I do not identify with a race 
[  ] Prefer not to respond 
[  ] Other:_______________________  
 
Question #8: 
Recall the clip you watched earlier. Do you happen to remember what the main focus 
of the political campaign advertisement in the clip was? Please select the best option 
from the following. 
[  ] Tough-on-crime record 
[  ] Family values 
[  ] Candidate’s experience/qualifications 
[  ] Special interests in elections 
[  ] Promises to decide cases impartially 














During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news on the 
Internet, not including sports? 
[  ] None 
[  ] One day 
[  ] Two days 
[  ] Three days 
[  ] Four days 
[  ] Five days 
[  ] Six days 
[  ] Seven days 
 
Question #10: 
During a typical week, how many days do you watch news on TV, not including 
sports? 
[  ] None 
[  ] One day 
[  ] Two days 
[  ] Three days 
[  ] Four days 
[  ] Five days 
[  ] Six days 
[  ] Seven days 
 
Question #11: 
During a typical week, how many days do you listen to news on the radio, not 
including sports? 
[  ] None 
[  ] One day 
[  ] Two days 
[  ] Three days 
[  ] Four days 
[  ] Five days 
[  ] Six days 
[  ] Seven days 
 
Question #12: 
In general, how much attention do you pay to news about government and politics? 
[  ] A great deal 
[  ] A lot 
[  ] A moderate amount 
[  ] A little 








Recall the clip you watched earlier. Do you happen to remember how many years of 
experience as a judge the candidate featured in the political campaign 
advertisement had? 
[  ] No experience 
[  ] 1-5 years of experience 
[  ] 6-10 years of experience 
[  ] 11-15 years of experience 
[  ] 15+ years of experience 
[  ] Unsure/don’t remember 
 
Question #14: 
Do you happen to know how many times an individual can be elected President of 
the United States under the current laws? 
[  ] Once 
[  ] Twice 
[  ] Three times 
[  ] Four times 
[  ] There is no limit to the number of times an individual can be elected President of 
the United States under the current laws 
[  ] Unsure/Don’t know 
 
Question #15: 
Do you happen to know for how many years a United States Senator is elected—that 
is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator? 
[  ] One year 
[  ] Two years 
[  ] Four years  
[  ] Six years 
[  ] Unsure/don’t know 
 
Question #16: 
Do you happen to know what Medicare is? 
[  ] A program run by the U.S. federal government to pay for old people’s health care 
[  ] A program run by state governments to provide health care to poor people   
[  ] A private health insurance plan sold to individuals in all 50 states 
[  ] A private, non-profit organization that runs free health clinics 













Keeping in mind that your answers are completely anonymous, generally speaking, 
do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or 
what? 
[  ] No preference 
[  ] Democrat 
[  ] Republican 
[  ] Independent 
[  ] Other 
 
Question #18: 
Recall the clip you watched earlier. If you had to make an assessment, how qualified 
do you feel the candidate mentioned in the campaign advertisement is? Please circle 
an option below. 
 
Well Qualified Qualified Not Qualified 
 
Question #19: 
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Below is a seven-
point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 
extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this 
scale, or haven’t you given much thought about this? Please indicate by circling the 
















Recall the clip you watched earlier. If you were voting, how likely would you be to vote 
for the candidate featured in the campaign advertisement? Please circle the most 
appropriate category. 
 
Very likely Somewhat 
Likely 
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